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There is ample anecdotal evidence that political influence constitutes a barrier to the 
integration of the EU banking market. Based on a dataset on the transparency on the 
supervisory review process of bank mergers in the EU, I estimate the probability that 
a bank is taken over as a function of bank and country characteristics and the 
transparency of merger control. The results indicate that banks are systematically 
more likely to be taken over by foreign credit institutions if the regulatory process is 
transparent. Particularly large banks seem to be less likely to be taken over by 
foreign banks if merger control lacks transparency.  
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Every time there is an attack on the banking system, every government in 
Europe is active, they intervene… France is just like the others.”  
(Henri Guaino, close advisor of French President Nicolas Sarkozy) 
1 Introduction 
Although the EU has removed barriers to cross-border banking through the 
harmonization of regulations and liberalization, the number of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the EU banking sector is still small 
compared to cross-border M&A in other sectors (European Commission, 
2005a). There are, however, large differences in the importance of the cross-
border dimension in the EU banking market. While the level of cross-border 
consolidation is low in Western European countries, cross-border M&A are 
more frequent in Central and Eastern Europe (Cabral et. al., 2002). This suggests 
there are still barriers to cross-border M&A in some EU countries. This paper 
analyzes whether government intervention is an obstacle to M&A in the EU 
banking sector.  
That national governments may constitute a barrier to banking market 
integration in the EU has recently been demonstrated in France as the French 
government made clear that it would protect Société Générale from being taken 
over by foreign banks. ‘Every time there is an attack on the banking system, 
every government in Europe is active, they intervene. France is just like the 
others’, said a close advisor of French president Nicolas Sarkozy. This was not 
the first time that French politicians intervened in the acquisition of domestic 
banks. The case of Crédit Lyonnais is another example. Crédit Lyonnais was 
privatized in 1999 with the government retaining 10 percent of ownership shares 
until the end of 2000. This made the cross-border acquisition of Crédit Lyonnais 
more difficult, since government officials repeatedly stated they would oppose a 
takeover by a foreign credit institution. The importance of the political 
dimension for bank acquisitions is also reflected by a statement of the former 
chairman of Lloyds TSB. In an interview with the French newspaper Le Figaro, 
he said that Lloyds would like to take over Crédit Lyonnais, but was put off by 
the regulatory and political climate in France. Political influence also played a 
role in the bidding war for Crédit Industriel et Commercial (CIC) in 1998 (Boot, 
1999). Although the Dutch ABN Amro was favoured because of its excellent 
track record vis-à-vis competing French bidders, CIC was sold to Crédit Mutuel. 
The political dimension of M&A seems to be important in other EU countries as 
well. In Portugal, politicians blocked the acquisition of the financial group 
Champlinaud by the Spanish Banco Santander Central Hispanio in 1999. In 
Italy, the acquisition of Banca Antonveneta and Banca Nazionale de Lavoro by 
ABN AMRO and the Spanish Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria were blocked by 
the Bank of Italy in 2005. Because it became later public that both deals were  
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not blocked for prudential reasons, but to protect domestic banks from foreign 
investors, the EU Commission brought actions against Italy for the infringement 
of the principle of the free movement of capital and the freedom of 
establishment. The EU Commission complained that the merger review process 
of the Bank of Italy creates uncertainty and lacks transparency. This may lead to 
a situation in which the supervisor can refuse authorization of a merger based on 
opaque concerns, e.g. regarding the ‘stability of governance’ (European 
Commission, 2005b).  
Although these examples demonstrate that government intervention makes 
cross-border M&A more difficult, systematic empirical evidence is missing. 
This paper aims to fill this gap. It relies on a unique database on the 
transparency of merger control in the EU banking sector. The paper proceeds as 
follows. Section 2 reviews the reasons for and the barriers to domestic and 
cross-border consolidation in the banking sector. Section 3 presents the 
empirical model and Section 4 the dataset. The determinants that affect the 
decision to take over domestic or foreign banks are presented in Section 5. In 
Section 6, I use a logit and multinomial logit framework to estimate the 
probability that a bank is taken over as a function of bank characteristics, 
country characteristics and the transparency of merger control. The robustness 
of the results is checked in Section 7. Section 8 concludes. I find that cross-
border takeovers are systematically more likely if merger control is more 
transparent. In particular, large banks are more likely to be taken over by foreign 
credit institutions if merger control is more transparent. This supports the 
hypothesis that politicians and supervisors block cross-border M&A to protect 
local credit institutions from foreign investors. Domestic M&A are, in contrast, 
not affected.  
2 Motives and Barriers to Consolidation in the EU 
Banking Sector 
M&A are undertaken for motives that can broadly be distinguished into value-
maximizing and non-value maximizing ones. Managers may engage in 
takeovers that are not driven by value maximization if they derive utility from 
empire building. Takeovers can then be viewed as a manifestation of the 
potential conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. In line with 
that Allen and Cebenoyan (1991) find that banks with a widely dispersed 
ownership structure and considerable power of the management are more likely 
to make acquisitions that increase size than banks that are dominated by a large 
shareholder that monitors the management. If the interests of managers and 
shareholders are aligned, M&A are undertaken to increase profits and to 
maximize shareholder value. One way is to generate economies of scale and  
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scope from takeovers (Berger et al., 2000). Despite the potential to generate cost 
synergies cross-border consolidation is limited in the EU banking sector. The 
number of cross-border M&A is particular low in Western Europe, while the 
cross-border dimension is more important in Central and Eastern Europe. Berger 
et al. (2001) explain the absence of cross-border M&A in the banking sector 
with the existence of barriers that reduce the efficiency gains that can be 
generated from consolidation. Examples for efficiency barriers are differences in 
the regulation and supervision of banks. Since foreign banks have to comply 
with regulations at home and abroad, domestic banks have cost advantages 
because complying with two different sets of regulations imposes additional 
costs on foreign banks. Differences in regulations also limit the degree to which 
products can be standardized across borders. This has recently been confirmed 
by a survey of the EU Commission (2005a). The survey indicates that 
differences in product regulation and consumer protection are an important 
barrier to cross-border consolidation in the EU financial sector. This makes 
cross-border takeovers less attractive relative to domestic M&A, since cost 
synergies are a key driver for consolidation in the financial sector (Berger et al., 
2004).  
Takeovers may also lead to X-efficiency gains. X-efficiency gains arise if the 
acquiring institution is more efficient ex-ante and brings the efficiency of the 
acquired bank up to its own level (Berger et al., 2000). Owing to cultural 
diversity, different languages and corporate cultures they are likely to be limited 
in cross-border M&A. Cross-border acquisitions may also be less attractive as 
compared to domestic M&A due to problems in monitoring managers at 
distance (Buch and De Long, 2003 and Buch, 2005; Berger et al., 2004). This is 
consistent with Buch and DeLong (2004). They explain the relative absence of 
cross-border deals in the banking sector by regulatory barriers and information 
costs related to distance and cultural factors. The empirical literature on the 
efficiency effects of M&A in the banking sector suggests that efficiency barriers 
exist. Beitel and Schierenbeck (2006), for example, find that the changes of the 
combined value of the bidder and target are zero or even negative in case of 
cross-border M&A, while the values of the combined institution is positive for 
domestic takeovers. Studies that compare the efficiency of foreign and domestic 
banks do not find much evidence for efficiency gains through cross-border 
M&A either. Vander Vennet (1996), for instance, concludes that foreign banks 
in Europe had about the same cost efficiency as domestic credit institutions, 
while Bonin et al. (2005) find that foreign banks are more cost efficient than 
domestic banks in Central and Eastern Europe. This indicates that foreign banks 
have advantages over local credit institutions in developing countries (Berger, 
2007). In contrast, the research for developed countries suggests that foreign 
banks are less efficient than local institutions in industrial countries (Berger,  
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2007). Since efficiency gains are a key driver for consolidation in the banking 
sector, cross-border consolidation is likely to be limited in Western Europe as 
long as efficiency barriers exist that offset most of the potential efficiency gains 
from takeovers. 
Banks are also taken over to increase market share and to get access to foreign 
banking markets. The latter may be particularly relevant for banks that have a 
large market share in their home country and are restricted in acquiring local 
banks for antitrust concerns. Furthermore, cross-border M&A are considered the 
most effective way to enter foreign retail-banking markets (Cabral et al., 2002). 
This is consistent with the literature that analyzes foreign bank expansion. It 
usually finds that subsidiaries are the dominant entry mode for banks that 
operate with local clients, while branches are more often chosen to provide 
financial services to local clients when they operate abroad (Foccarelli and 
Pozzolo, 2005 and Cerutti et al., 2007). Subsidiaries are usually established via 
the acquisition of local banks. In particular, banks with a large branch network 
and a large market share are attractive targets. Despite the benefits of taking 
over such banks, large cross-border deals are limited in Western Europe. Banks 
mainly enter these countries via branches or via the acquisition of small credit 
institutions. In the EU banking sector, market entry via branches is easier than 
via subsidiaries, since branches do not need prior approval by the supervisor in 
the host country. The acquisition of small banks, in turn, is less likely to be 
blocked if politicians and supervisors only want the largest banks in domestic 
hands.  
The role of politicians and supervisors in cross-border consolidation in the EU 
banking sector is emphasized by Boot (1999). He argues that central banks, 
ministries of finance and domestic banks operate in close concert to block cross-
border and to promote domestic M&A. For Berger (2007) implicit government 
barriers are one of the main reasons for the small market share of foreign banks 
in Western Europe relative to Central and Eastern Europe. These include 
delaying or denying cross-border takeovers and encouraging domestic banks to 
merge with each other to become larger and more difficult to acquire (Berger, 
2007). This was demonstrated in Italy in 2005 in case of the acquisition of 
Banca Antonveneta (BA) and Banca Nazionale de Lavoro (BNL) by the Dutch 
ABN Amro and the Spanish Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA). Both 
deals were blocked by the Bank of Italy. Although the acquisition of BA was 
finally approved, the merger review process considerably delayed the deal and 
increased uncertainty and risk for ABN Amro. The second deal, however, failed 
after BBVA withdrew its takeover bid in response to a counterbid by the Italian 
insurer Unipol. Because it became later public that both deals were not blocked 
for prudential reasons, but to protect local banks from foreign investors, the EU 
Commission brought actions against Italy for infringement of the principle of  
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the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment. Furthermore, the 
Commission complained that the merger review process of the Bank of Italy 
creates legal uncertainty and lacks transparency. This may lead to a situation in 
which the supervisor can block M&A based on opaque concerns (European 
Commission, 2005b).  
Berger (2007) mentions further explicit and implicit government barriers to 
consolidation. Examples for explicit government barriers are restrictions on 
capital flows and foreign ownership. Since many explicit barriers have been 
lowered over time, implicit barriers may be more important to cross-border 
consolidation in the EU banking sector at present (Berger, 2007). In contrast to 
explicit barriers, they do not single out foreign banks in a formal way. Implicit 
barriers arise not only from the actions of politicians and supervisors to block 
cross-border M&A during merger control, but also from differences in the rules 
and regulations that govern banks and their market environment (Berger, 2007). 
Another implicit government barrier to cross-border consolidation is direct 
ownership and subsidy of banks by the state (Berger, 2007). Banks that are 
subsidized often have mandates to make loans at below-market rates to targeted 
customers like specific firms, industries or regions. State-owned banks may also 
have lower credit standards than private banks. In some countries, state banks 
also have a large market share. Together this may crowd out private banks and 
make foreign bank entry and cross-border acquisitions less attractive (Berger, 
2007). 
To identify the motives for and the barriers to consolidation, several empirical 
studies have analyzed the determinants of domestic and cross-border M&A in 
the banking sector. Foccarelli and Pozzolo (2001) focus on the acquirer. They 
find that large and efficient banks are more likely to be the acquirer in cross-
border takeovers in the OECD. Banks with a larger share of non-interest income 
are also more likely to engage in cross-border acquisitions. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that efficient banks are more likely to overcome efficiency 
barriers and to generate a sufficient return on investment from takeovers. 
Pasiouras et al. (2007) focus on acquirer and targets in 15 EU countries. Their 
results indicate that targets are larger in size, less capitalized, less liquid and less 
efficient compared to banks that were not involved in M&A. This is consistent 
with Hernando et al. (2009). They distinguish between cross-border and 
domestic M&A and find that poorly managed banks are more likely to be 
acquired in the EU. Large banks are also more likely to be taken over in case of 
domestic M&A. Banks operating in more concentrated markets are, in contrast, 
less likely to be acquired by domestic banks, but are more likely to be taken over 
by banks from other countries. This suggests that the likelihood that a bank is 
taken over not only depends on the characteristics of the bank, but also on the  
  6
characteristics of the country where the bank is located. The effect of these 
characteristics may, furthermore, differ for domestic and cross-border takeovers. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the determinants of M&A in 
the banking sector by concentrating on explicit and implicit government barriers 
consolidation. First of all, I analyze whether explicit government barriers like 
restrictions on banking activities and international capital flows reduce the 
likelihood that a bank is taken over. Second, I examine whether merger control 
is an implicit barrier to consolidation. As demonstrated in Italy in 2005, 
supervisors and politicians have considerable scope to block cross-border 
takeovers if the merger review process lacks transparency. The aim of this paper 
is to find out whether merger control is not only a barrier to cross-border 
consolidation in Italy, but whether it constitutes a systematic barrier to M&A in 
the EU banking sector.  
3 Empirical Model 















where   is the probability that bank j is taken over in period t. X is a matrix of 
bank- and country-specific variables that are relevant for a bank becoming a 
target.
jt P
β  is the vector of coefficients.  
Problematic is that the effect of the explanatory variables may differ for 
domestic and cross-border M&A. Banks may, for example, by less likely to be 
acquired by foreign banks if supervisors and politicians block cross-border 
takeovers. Domestic M&A may, in contrast, be more likely if politicians 
promote mergers among local credit institutions to make them larger and more 
difficult to acquire. Hence, I additionally estimate a multinomial logit model that 
allows multiple choices. The probability that a bank is taken over is then 
described as follows: 
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D P  and   is the probability that a bank is taken over by a domestic and 
a foreign bank, respectively. 
jt
CB P
D β  and 
CB β  are the vector of coefficients. The 
effect of the explanatory variables is, hence, allowed to differ for domestic and 
cross-border M&A.   
4 Data  
The dataset includes data on banks and M&A in the EU banking sector for the 
period between 1997 and 2005. The countries included are Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Information on 
M&A comes from Zephyr (2008). Balance-sheet data is taken from the 
BankScope (2008). I use consolidated balance sheets whenever possible and 
focus on commercial banks.  
The geographical distribution of banks and deals is reported in Table 1. The 
dataset includes 1,407 banks. The largest number of banks is located in 
Germany (256), France (246), Italy (158) and the United Kingdom (153). All 
other countries have fewer than 100 banks. The dataset comprises 150 deals of 
which 77 were domestic and 73 cross-border. Table 1 indicates that there are 
differences in takeover activity across countries. While domestic takeovers 
outnumber cross-border M&A in most Western European countries, cross-
border deals are more important in Central and Eastern Europe. Cross-border 
consolidation is more advanced in Central and Eastern European countries, 
because many countries from this region suffered from banking crises in the 
1990s and allowed failed banks to be taken over by foreign credit institutions 
(Hernando et al., 2009). The privatization of state-owned banks has further 
increased the level of cross-border consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Both suggest that these countries have reduced barriers to the entry of foreign 
banks (Berger, 2007). The distribution of deals across years is reported in Table 
2. Table 2 indicates that cross-border M&A were particularly important in 2005.  
5 Determinants of M&A in the EU Banking Sector 
5.1  Bank Characteristics  
To find out which banks are more likely to be taken over, I include total bank 
assets (SIZE), the return-on-assets (ROA), the ratio of net-interest revenue to  
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APITAL) 
all variables are winsorized at the 1- 
ncy enhancement. They may also be more risky if the source of the 
ce the potential to generate cost synergies from takeovers and 
anking markets are not easily conquerable from distance, the 
total revenue (NIREV), the ratio of total equity to total bank assets (C
and the ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-term funding (LIQUID) in 
the regression model. To eliminate outliers, 
and 99-percent level. For a list of variables used in the regression analysis see 
Table 3. 
ROA - The return-on-assets controls for the motive to generate X-efficiency 
gains from takeovers. Since X-efficiency gains are more likely to be achieved if 
the target is inefficient, I expect that banks with a low ROA are more likely to 
be acquired. Underperforming banks may not only offer greater opportunities 
for efficie
underperformance is a high level of bad loans. In such a case, a domestic 
acquirer may be in a better position to reduce the amount of bad loans and to 
improve performance than a foreign acquirer. This suggests that efficiency 
enhancement should a priori be more relevant for domestic than for cross-
border M&A.  
SIZE - The logarithm of total bank assets measures the size of the bank. SIZE 
controls for the motive to generate economies of scale and scope. Since 
economies of scale and scope increase with bank size, large banks are more 
attractive targets. However, organizational complexity also increases with SIZE. 
This may redu
lower the probability that a large bank is taken over. The acquisition of large 
banks may also be more likely to raise problems with the antitrust authority. 
This should be particularly relevant for domestic M&A, since foreign credit 
institutions usually do not have any or only a small market share in the host 
country. This suggests that the effect of SIZE may differ for domestic and cross-
border M&A. 
NIREV - To control for the business model of a bank, I use the ratio of net-
interest revenue to total revenue. A large proportion of interest income indicates 
that a bank is more active in retail-banking. This may be relevant for banks that 
take over foreign banks to get access to local retail-banking markets. Since 
foreign retail-b
most effective way to get access to such markets seems to be the merger with or 
the acquisition of an existing local credit institution (Cabral et al., 2002). Retail-
banking has become more attractive because it provides a more stable source of 
income than investment banking. Retail-banks also face lower refinancing costs, 
since refinancing via deposits is cheaper than via interbank borrowing. Both has  
become visible in the recent crisis. However, retail-banking is often regarded as 
more costly in terms of the required branch network and staff (Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2000). Non-interest-earning activities are also often considered as 
having a larger growth potential than interest-earning activities. For this reason,  
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ers his 
knowledge on risk diversification on the target. However, a high level of capital 
e, a low level of liquidity should raise the likelihood that a bank is 
taken over. On the other hand, a high level of liquidity may indicate a lack of 
 consistent with the hypothesis that banks are acquired to obtain 
market power and to generate economies of scale and scope. Measured by the 
NIREV is often regarded as measuring bank inefficiency as well (Foccarelli and 
Pozzolo, 2001). Banks with a larger proportion of net-interest revenue to total 
revenue may, hence, not only have a stronger focus on retail-banking activities, 
but may also be less efficient. Both suggest that credit institutions with a larger 
proportion of net-interest revenue to total revenue are more likely to be 
acquired. Since market access is more important for foreign than for domestic 
banks, NIREV should a priori be more relevant for cross-border M&A.  
CAPITAL - To control for bank capital, I include the ratio of total equity to total 
bank assets. The effect of CAPITAL is not clear a priori. On the one hand, a 
higher level of capital may raise the probability that a bank is acquired if highly 
capitalized banks are less diversified. Such banks are attractive for acquirers that 
are more diversified, since the acquirer can free capital if he transf
may also indicate better management skills. This may reduce the likelihood that 
a bank is acquired, since X-efficiency gains are expected to be smaller. 
Moreover, Hannan and Pilloff (2006) point out that acquirers prefer highly 
leveraged (low capitalized) targets because it enables them to maximize the 
magnitude of post-merger performance gains relative to the cost of achieving 
those gains.   
LIQUID - The ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-term funding is 
included to find out whether liquidity affects that likelihood that a bank is taken 
over. The effect of LIQUID is not clear a priori. On the one hand, banks are 
more likely to be acquired if they are close to illiquidity and need external 
support. Henc
investment opportunities and managerial inefficiency. This should make banks 
more attractive to potential investors and increase the likelihood that a bank is 
acquired. 
Table 4 present summary statistics for the bank-specific variables. T-tests on the 
sample mean are reported in Table 5 and piecewise correlation coefficients in 
Table 6. The numbers are broadly consistent with the hypotheses put forward. 
Large banks (SIZE) are more likely to be taken over than small credit 
institutions
cost-income ratio (CIR) and the return-on-assets (ROA) targets are also less 
efficient than banks that were not acquired. This supports the hypothesis that 
banks tend to take over less efficient credit institutions to generate X-efficiency 
gains from better management and organization. Particularly domestic M&A 
seem to be driven by the motive to improve X-efficiency. Banks that were not 
taken over are, in contrast, significantly better capitalized (CAPITAL) and more  
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y environment in the country where the 
potential target is located. Berger et al. (2004), for example, show that banks are 
l. 
limited by government ownership and subsidy of banks by the state (Berger, 
liquid (LIQUID) consistent with the hypothesis that less capitalized and less 
liquid banks are more likely to be acquired. The proportion of net interest 
revenue to total revenue (NIREV), in contrast, is significantly higher for targets 
than for banks that were not acquired. This indicates that targets are more active 
in retail-banking. In particular, cross-border targets derive a large proportion of 
their income from interest-earning activities. This supports the hypothesis that 
foreign banks take over domestic credit institutions to get access to local retail-
banking markets.  
5.2  Explicit and Implicit Government Barriers to Consolidation 
The likelihood that a bank is taken over may also depend on the extent of 
explicit and implicit government barriers to consolidation (Berger, 2007). Such 
barriers arise from the legal and regulator
more likely to take over foreign banks if regulatory restrictions on financial 
activities are low and supervisory authorities more reliable. Pasiouras et a
(2007) find that the level of banking regulations affects the decision of a bank to 
acquire a credit institution in the EU-25 as well. In particular, more stringent 
capital and disclosure requirements raise the likelihood that a bank is acquired. 
This is consistent with Buch and DeLong (2004). They find that financial 
institutions appreciate strict regulatory standards and do not engage in regulatory 
arbitrage. Their overall results, however, suggest that banking regulation and 
supervision only plays a relatively modest role in explaining cross-border M&A.  
More relevant may be whether capital flows and ownership are restricted. To 
find out whether such explicit government barriers limit consolidation in the EU 
banking market, I include an Index on Investment Freedom (INVFREE). The 
likelihood that a bank is taken over may also depend on whether banks are 
restricted in their business activities. Cross-border consolidation may also be 
2007). To find out whether government ownership and restrictions on financial 
activities reduce the probability that a bank is taken over, I use an Index on 
Financial Freedom (FINFREE). Both indices are from the Heritage Foundation 
(2008). Since a larger value for FINFREE and INVFREE indicates fewer 
restrictions on capital flows and greater financial freedom, I expect that both 
indices are positively related with the likelihood that a bank is taken over. In 
particular, cross-border M&A should be more likely if investment and financial 
freedom is high.  
Consolidation may also be limited by merger control if supervisors block certain 
takeovers during the merger review process to protect local credit institutions. 
This was demonstrated in Italy in 2005 in case of Banca Antonveneta (BA) and  
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rs are one of the main reasons for the small market share of 
foreign banks in Western Europe relative to Central and Eastern Europe. To find 
e to put pressure on the supervisor to block cross-border M&A if the 
supervisory authority is more independent. Hence, it should be easier for foreign 
f merger control lacks transparency. This is emphasized by the EU 
Commission (2005b). The Commission argues that the supervisor has more 
f the bank sector (DBAGDP), the level of stock market 
capitalization (STKMCAP) and the degree of banking market concentration 
(C3).  
Banca Nazionale de Lavoro (BNL). For Berger (2007), such implicit 
government barrie
out whether merger control constitutes an implicit barrier to consolidation, I 
include the Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index 
(INDEPENDENCE) and the Transparency of Merger Control Index 
(TRANSPARENCY). Both indices are taken from Köhler (2007). Summary 
statistics for INDEPENDENCE and TRANSPARENCY are presented in Table 
7. 
INDEPENDENCE - The Independence of the Supervisory Authority Index 
measures the degree of independence of the supervisory authorities in the EU 
banking sector. The index ranges from zero to two with higher values indicating 
that the supervisor is more independent. I assume that politicians should be less 
abl
credit institutions to take over domestic banks if the supervisor is more 
independent. Domestic M&A may, in contrast, be less likely. This suggests that 
the effect of INDEPENDENCE may differ for domestic and cross-border 
takeovers. 
TRANSPARENCY - The Transparency of Merger Control Index measures the 
degree of transparency of the merger review process in the EU banking sector. 
The index ranges from zero to one with higher values indicating a greater degree 
of transparency. I assume that regulators have more scope to block certain 
takeovers i
scope to block certain takeovers in the banking sector if merger control lacks 
transparency. This suggests that it should be easier for foreign banks to take over 
a domestic bank if merger control is more transparent. If politicians promote 
mergers among local banks, domestic M&A may, in contrast, be less likely. This 
suggests that the effect of TRANSPARENCY may differ for domestic and 
cross-border M&A.  
5.3  Other Country Characteristics 
To find out whether the likelihood that a bank is taken over depends on other 
country characteristics as well, I include the ratio of aggregate imports to GDP 
(IMGDP), the size o 
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ports to GDP measures the degree of 
n use branches as main entry mode, while 
ountry more attractive for cross-border 
should reduce the risk of loan default 
IMGDP – The ratio of ratio of aggregate im
trade openness of a country. IMGDP should be relevant for banks that want to 
provide trade-related services to local clients when they operate abroad (Heinkel 
and Levi, 1992, Ter Wengel, 1995 and Yamori, 1998). Banks located in 
countries that are more open to trade should, hence, be more likely to be taken 
over. However, the empirical evidence suggest that banks that pursue a follow-
your-customer strategy ofte
subsidiaries are more often chosen in order to operate with local clients 
(Foccarelli and Pozzolo, 2005 and Cerutti et al., 2007). The follow-your-
customer strategy may, thus, not be the dominant motivation behind cross-
border M&A. IMGDP may also matter for domestic banks if they provide 
services to foreign customers. However, a priori IMGDP should be more 
relevant for cross-border M&A. 
DBAGDP – The size of the banking sector is measured by the ratio of total 
banking sector assets to GDP. The effect of DBAGDP on the probability that a 
bank is taken over is not clear a priori. On the one hand, a larger banking sector 
may raise the probability that a bank is taken, since a larger banking market 
offers greater opportunities to generate economies of scale and scope (Buch and 
DeLong, 2004). A large banking sector also offers a larger market potential than 
a small banking market. This makes a c
takeovers. Greater expansion opportunities may, furthermore, reduce the need of 
local institutions to expand abroad. This should make domestic M&A more 
likely. On the other hand, a larger banking sector may reduce the likelihood that 
a bank is acquired if larger and more developed banking markets are less 
profitable (Buch and DeLong, 2004 and Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999 and 
2000). 
STKMCAP – The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP measures the size 
of the stock market. The effect of STKMCAP on the probability that a bank is 
acquired is ambigious. On the one hand, a higher level of stock market 
capitalization may reduce the probability that a bank is taken over, since 
competition is greater in larger and more developed financial systems 
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000). However, a larger stock market may 
allow firms to be better capitalized. This 
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000). Furthermore, at a higher level of stock 
market capitalization, more information on publicly traded firms is available. 
This enables banks to better evaluate credit risk (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2000). This should increase profits and raise the likelihood that a bank is taken 
over. 
C3 – The level of banking market concentration is measured by the market share 
of the three largest banks. The effect of C3 is not clear a priori (Hannan and  
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rger reduces the level of banking market competition. Cross-border M&A 
are less likely to be challenged for antitrust concerns, because a foreign acquirer 
stic consolidation. For a list of the variables used in the 
regression analysis see Table 3. 
 together in the same regression. This model 
constitutes my baseline. In the next step, I add one legal and regulatory variable 
r to the baseline model. Finally, I estimate a model with all 
iables together in a single regression. The results of the logit 
 Table 8. To account for time-fixed effects, I use time 
ression coefficients reported are to be interpreted as 
motive to generate efficiency gains from economies of scale and scope and 
Rhoades, 1987 and Hannan and Pilloff, 2006). On the one hand, a high level of 
banking market concentration may raise the probability that a bank is taken over 
by a domestic bank, since market power can be enhanced by the acquisition. On 
the other hand, domestic M&A may be less likely if antitrust authorities fear that 
the me
likely has only a small or no market share in the target’s domestic market. 
Cross-border M&A may also be more likely if concentrated banking markets are 
more profitable owing to less competition between local banks. This suggests 
that C3 may affect domestic and cross-border takeovers in the EU banking 
sector differently. 
Finally, I include a dummy variable which is set equal to one for countries that 
are members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and zero otherwise. EMU 
membership may increase the probability that a bank is taken over by a bank 
from another EMU country, since a common currency eliminates exchange-rate 
risks. This should facilitate cross-border consolidation in the euro area. If banks 
are afraid of being taken over by foreign banks, EMU may also raise the 
pressure for dome
6 Results 
6.1  Logit Regression 
The regression analysis proceeds in different steps. First, I include the bank-
specific and the country-specific variables separately in the regression. Then 
both types of variables are put
after the othe
regulatory var
regressions are reported in
dummy variables. The reg
affecting the odds ratio with respect to the baseline case and not as marginal 
probability. 
The results are in line with the hypotheses put forward. Consistent with 
Pasiouras et al. (2007), I find that large banks are more likely to be taken over as 
indicated by the significant and positive coefficient for SIZE. Less efficient 
banks are also more likely to be acquired. ROA is significant and has a negative 
sign. This suggests that takeovers in the EU banking sector are driven by the  
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ratio (CIR). CIR is significant and negative indicating that banks 
with a lower level of cost-efficiency are more likely to be taken over. NIREV is 
nks are less likely to be taken over if a bank is 
located in a country with more competitive financial sector. The degree of 
parent. The degree of independence of the 
supervisory authority, in contrast, does not matter. INDEPENDENCE is 
ionally estimate a multinomial logit model that allows multiple 
choices. 
The results of the multinomial logit regressions are reported in Table 9. They 
confirm the results of the logistic regressions. SIZE increases the probability that 
higher X-efficiency. To test the robustness of the result, I replace ROA by the 
cost-income 
significant as well. The positive coefficient suggests that banks with stronger 
focus on retail-banking activities are more likely to be acquired. The degree of 
liquidity and the level of capitalization, in contrast, do not matter. Both LIQUID 
and CAPITAL are insignificant.  
The probability that a bank is taken over also depends on the characteristics of 
the country where it is located. I find that banks from countries with a larger 
stock market (STKMCAP) and a larger banking sector (DBAGDP) are less 
likely to be taken over. This is consistent with Buch and DeLong (2004), 
Pasiouras et al. (2007) and Pozzolo (2009). Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 
offer an explanation. They argue that profit opportunities are lower in countries 
with a larger and more developed financial system. Since profits are one of the 
main drivers for consolidation, ba
banking market concentration (C3), in contrast, does not matter. IMGDP and 
EMU are not significant either. 
The probability that a bank is taken over also depends on the extent of explicit 
and implicit government barriers to consolidation. The results for INVFREE 
suggest that banks are more likely to be acquired if capital flows are not 
restricted. However, there is no evidence that greater financial freedom 
(FINFREE) makes takeovers more likely. The transparency of the merger 
review process also matters. TRANSPARENCY is significant and has a positive 
sign consistent with the hypothesis that banks are more likely to be acquired if 
merger control is more trans
insignificant.  
6.2  Multinomial Logit Regression 
Problematic is that the effect of the explanatory variables may differ for 
domestic and cross-border M&A. Banks may, for example, be less likely to be 
acquired by foreign banks if supervisors block cross-border M&A during merger 
control. Domestic takeovers may, in contrast, be more likely if supervisors and 
politicians promote mergers among local banks to form ‘national champions’. 
Hence, I addit 
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 also more likely to be acquired. Both 
in the EU banking sector have been 
a bank is taken over. Inefficient banks are
is consistent with previous studies on domestic and cross-border M&A in the 
EU banking sector (Lanine and Vander Vennet, 2007; Pasiouras et al., 2007 and 
Hernando et al., 2009). NIREV is significant and positive for cross-border M&A 
in line with the hypothesis that banks take over foreign credit institutions to get 
access to local banking markets. As expected, NIREV is not significant for 
domestic deals. LIQUID and CAPITAL remain insignificant for both domestic 
and cross-border M&A. 
The results for the country-specific variables also differ for domestic and cross-
border M&A. I find significant differences for IMGDP. The significant and 
positive coefficient in the equation for cross-border M&A is consistent with the 
follow-your-customer strategy according to which banks expand into countries 
where customers from the home country are located in order to provide services 
related to their business. Domestic takeovers, in contrast, seem to less likely in 
countries that are more open to trade. The effect of STKMCAP and DBAGDP, 
in contrast, does not differ for domestic and cross-border M&A. Both variables 
are significant and reduce the likelihood that a bank is taken over. As in case of 
the logit regressions, the degree of banking market concentration (C3) and EMU 
are not significant.  
The effect of INVFREE differs for domestic and cross-border takeovers. While 
domestic takeovers are not affected by restrictions on international capital flows, 
cross-border M&A are. The positive and significant coefficient for FINFREE in 
the equation for cross-border M&A suggest that banks are more likely to be 
taken over by foreign banks if international capital flows are not restricted. 
However, if I include FINFREE, INDEPENDENCE and TRANSPARENCY as 
additional explanatory variables, INVFREE becomes insignificant. FINFREE is 
not significant either. The results, hence, do provide strong evidence that explicit 
government barriers like restrictions on capital flows and financial activity limit 
consolidation in the EU banking sector. This might have been expected, since 
many explicit barriers to consolidation 
lowered over time through regulatory harmonization and liberalization (Berger, 
2007).  
6.3  Merger Control as Barrier to Consolidation in the EU 
Banking Sector 
The logit regressions indicate that banks in the EU are more likely to be 
acquired if the merger review process is more transparent. To find whether the 
effect differs for domestic and cross-border takeovers, I next include  
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As expected, the results differ for domestic and cross-border M&A. While 
 positive coefficient indicates that banks are less likely 
e merger review process not only restricts cross-border 
consolidation in Italy, but that it constitutes a systematic barrier to cross-border 
s-border takeovers. The coefficients, however, suggest that 
the effect of TRANSPARENCY is significantly higher for large than for small 
INDEPENDENCE and TRANSPARENCY. The results are reported in columns 
6 to 9 of Table 9.  
INDEPENDENCE remains insignificant for domestic and cross-border 
takeovers, TRANSPARENCY is significant for cross-border, but insignificant 
for domestic M&A. The
to be taken over by a foreign credit institution if merger control lacks 
transparency. In this case, supervisors have more scope to block cross-border 
takeovers. This was demonstrated in Italy in 2005 in the case of Banca 
Antonveneta and Banca Nazionale de Lavoro. The results indicate that a lack of 
transparency of th
takeovers in the EU banking sector. This is in line with a survey of the EU 
Commission (2005a). The survey identifies the merger review process, the 
misuse of supervisory powers and political interference as important barriers to 
cross-border consolidation in the EU financial sector. Particularly large banks 
with previous experience in M&A regard them as important barrier to cross-
border consolidation. This is consistent with recent comments of the French 
government that it would protect Société Générale from being acquired by a 
foreign bank. Société Générale is the second largest bank in France. The results 
are also in line with Boot (1999). He argues that the political dimension of bank 
mergers is particularly important if politicians want to protect national flagships. 
This suggests that cross-border acquisitions of large banks are more likely to be 
blocked in the EU banking sector than the acquisition of small banks by foreign 
credit institutions.  
To test this hypothesis, I create three dummy variables each representing a 
different bank size. Banks are considered as small if their assets are below the 
25-percentile (SMALL), medium-sized if their assets lie within the 25- and 75-
percentile (MEDIUM) and large if their assets exceed the 75-percentile 
(LARGE). Since I multiply these dummies with the TRANSPARENCY, each 
coefficient measures the effect of TRANSPARENCY for a different bank size. 
The results of the regressions with the interaction terms are presented in Table 
10. The interaction terms turn out to be insignificant for domestic, but 
significant for cros
and medium-sized banks. This supports the hypothesis that particularly cross-
border acquisitions of large banks are more likely to be blocked if merger 
control lacks transparency.   
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s located in Central and Eastern Europe. Third, I 
include a set of country dummies. Country dummies control for omitted 
ver time and that are specific to each country. 
particularly low in the larger Western European countries, 
cross-border M&A are more frequent in Central and Eastern European countries 
. The motivation of this paper was to find out whether these 
7 Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of the regression results, I perform several robustness 
tests. First, to control for the fact that many Central and Eastern European 
countries opened their banking sectors to foreign investors during their 
transformation to a market-based economy and in response to privatization, I 
include a dummy variable which is equal to one for countries that are located in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) and zero otherwise. Second, I estimate the 
model only for the countrie
variables that do not vary o
Examples for such time-invariant determinants of takeovers are culture or 
language. Country dummies also control for the attitude of the government 
toward foreign investment in the banking sector as long as it does not change 
over time. Fourth, to test the robustness of the multinomial logit regressions, I 
run separate logit regressions for domestic and cross-border M&A. Furthermore, 
I re-estimate my model using multinomial probit instead of multinomial logit 
regression. The results, however, do not change. TRANSPARENCY is 
significant and positive for cross-border, but not significant for domestic M&A. 
INDEPENDENCE remains insignificant. The results are not reported for the 
sake of brevity.   
8 Conclusions 
Although the EU has removed barriers to cross-border banking through the 
harmonization of regulations and liberalization, the number of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the EU banking sector is still small 
compared to cross-border M&A in other sectors (European Commission, 
2005a). There are, however, large differences in the importance of the cross-
border dimension in EU banking markets. While the level of cross-border 
consolidation is 
(Cabral et. al., 2002)
differences can be explained by explicit and implicit government barriers to 
consolidation.  
The paper shows that cross-border consolidation in the EU banking sector is 
mainly limited by implicit government barriers. Implicit barriers arise from 
merger control if politicians and supervisors block cross-border takeovers during 
the merger review process for opaque concerns. In particular, large banks are 
less likely to be taken over by foreign credit institutions if merger control lacks 
transparency. For this reason, the recent effort of the EU Commission to 
increase the transparency of the merger review process is an important step to  
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on in Europe. Explicit barriers like, for example, restrictions on 
capital flows and financial activities, in contrast, do not seem to matter. Such 
rocess leads to a positive reaction of bank stocks. Stock market 
reactions are particularly strong if merger control is more transparent and the 
 relative disadvantages of foreign banks in 
Western Europe. Since efficiency gains are a key driver for consolidation in the 
lower implicit barriers to consolidation and to increase the degree of banking 
market integrati
barriers have been lowered over time by liberalization and regulatory 
harmonization. 
The results have implications for efficiency in the EU banking sector. Since 
government intervention is usually not driven by efficiency considerations, a 
greater degree of transparency of the merger review process should not only 
make cross-border takeovers more likely, but also improve efficiency and boost 
bank valuation. This corresponds to Carletti et al. (2007). They analyze whether 
changes in merger control legislation toward a greater focus on competition 
instead of financial soundness affect stock-prices in the EU banking sector. 
Their results suggest that a stronger focus on competition and efficiency in the 
merger review p
authority in charge more independent. Both reduces the discretion of the 
regulatory process and enhances the efficiency of envisioned M&A in the EU 
banking sector (Carletti et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, the regression results suggest that consolidation in the EU banking 
sector is driven by the desire to generate economies of scale and scope. X-
efficiency gains through better management techniques and organization 
influence the decision to take over another credit institution as well. Efficiency 
gains are usually found to be easier to achieve in developing countries in which 
foreign banks have relative advantages over local banks. In developed countries, 
in contrast, foreign banks are less efficient than local institutions (Berger, 2007). 
This suggests that the efficiency gains generated from cross-border takeovers 
may not be sufficient to outweigh the
banking sector, cross-border consolidation is, hence, likely to be limited in 
Western Europe as long as efficiency barriers exist that offset most of the 
potential efficiency gains from takeovers. This indicates that the small number 
of cross-border M&A in Western Europe relative to Central and Eastern Europe 
is primarily the result of a combination of net comparative disadvantages of 
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 Banks and Deals by Country 
  Number of  
Banks 
Number of  
M&A 
of which:  
Domestic M&A 
of which:  
Cross-Border M&A 
Austria  1  1  57  2 
Belgium 36  1  1  0 
Cyprus 18  0  0  0 
blic  27  7  1  6 
60  3  3 
Czech Repu








Poland 51  10  8  2 
Slovak Rep 10 
Sweden 
United King 1  3 
77  73 
Estonia 6  11  0  11 
Finland 7  0  0  0 
246  13  7  6 
256  27  20  7 
25  3  1  2 
8 
Ireland 39  1  0  1 
Italy 158  22  21  1 
25  9  1  8 
11  5  1  4 
2  0  2 
Portugal 10  1  1  0 
ublic  21  11  1 
Slovenia 25  4  2  2 
Spain 87  4  3  1 
19  2  2  0 
dom  153  4 
Total 1,407  150 
Source: Zepyhr (2008), Bankscope (2008) 
 
 Deals by Year of Completion 
Number of  
Table 2:
of which:   of which:  
-Border M&A 
Year 
M&A  Domestic M&A Cross
1997 4  1  3 
1998 3  1  2 
1999 15  10  5 
2000 20  11  9 
2001 22  14  8 
2002 26  15  11 
2003 16  7 9 
2004 15  8 7 
2005 29  10  19 
Total 150  77  73 
Source: Zepyhr (2008)  
Table 3: Variables 
 
SIZE  Log(Total Bank Assets)   So Banksc 200 urce:  ope ( 8) 
ROA  Return-on-Assets   Sour 2
CIR  Cost-Income Ratio   Sour
CAPITAL Total  Equity/T Assets    : Ba 2008) 
LIQUID  Liquid Assets/Customer and Term Funding  Source: Bankscope (2008) 
NIREV  Net-Interest Revenue/T ue   So ankscope (2008) 
IMGDP  r o ce: Data
DBAGDP  Deposit Money Ba       So nk (2008) 
STKMCAP  Stock Market Capitalization/      Source: Worldbank (2008) 
C3  Market Share of the Three L est Banks     Source: Worldbank (2008) 
FINFREE  Financial Freedom Index   Source: Heritage Foundation (2008) 
INVFREE  Investment Freedom x       Source: Heritage Foundation (2008) 
INDEPENDEN   n e nce of Su  Authority Index  
TRANSPARENCY  Transparency of Mer trol Index     Source: Köhler (2007) 
EMU  Dummy Vari  a bank is located in a country that is member of the European Monetary Union  
CEEC  Dummy Variable indicating whether a bank is located in Central and Eastern Europe 
SMALL   Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is small. Banks are considered as small if their assets are below the 25-percentile. 
MEDIUM  Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is s entile. 
LARGE  Dummy vari  a bank is small. Banks are considered as large if their assets are above the 75-percentile. 
TRANSPARENCY*SMALL  Interaction term bet  INDEPENDENCE and SMALL 
TRANSPARE n ct  t  b DEPENDENCE and MEDIUM 
















     
nk Assets/GDP  









CE I dep nde isory
 Con
    Source: Köhler (2007) 









 Table 4: Summary Statistics  
All Banks  Obs. Mean  Median  Max. Min.  Std.  Dev. 
Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE)  5,815  13.55  13. 19.60  9.49  1.91  39 
Cost-Income  Ratio  (CIR)  5,724 71.33 66. 273.55 7.69  35.84 
Return-on-Assets  (ROA)  5,815  0.65 0. 9.19 -9.08  1.88 
Total Equity/Total Assets (CAPITAL)  5,815  12.46  8. 88.50  1.00  12.96 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding  (LIQUID)  5,815 37.32 22. 271.43 0.00  45.54 
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue (NIREV)  5,815 32.82 32. 92.86 -6.55  18.28 
         






Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE)  150  14.30  19.60  9.49  2.01  14.13 
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR)  149  82.51  250.00  19.97  33.50 
Return-on-Assets  (ROA)  150  8.13 -9.08  2.16 
Total Equity/Total Assets (CAPITAL)  150  73.30  1.00  9.69 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding  (LIQUID)  150  180.19 0.02  25.37 
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue  (NIREV)  150  78.54 -0.32  14.94 
         















Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE)  77  19.60  9.49  2.20  14.44  14.21 
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR)  76  250.00  34.49  40.12 
Return-on-Assets  (ROA)  77  8.13 -9.08  2.26 
Total Equity/Total Assets (CAPITAL)  77  73.30  1.00  11.01 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short  Funding  (LIQUID)  77  105.80 0.15  21.67 
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenu IREV)  78.54  3.94  14.78 
      























e  (N 77 
 
bs.  O  
Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE)  19.60 10.49  1.79  73  14.15  14.08   
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR)  1 .97  23.96 
Return-on-Assets  OA)  .08  2.05 
Total Equity/T t A 1 00  8.16 
Liquid Assets/Custo 1 02  28.91 
Net-Interest Re u 7 .32  14.72 
     








































































  (LIQUID) 
O  
Log(Total Ban s E 0 49  1.90  k As ets) (SIZ )  5,665  13.53  13.37  19.6   9.
Cost-Income  R 2 69  35.86 
Return-on-Assets  ) .08  1.87 
Total Equity/T A 0 00  13.03 
Liquid Assets/Custo 2 00  45.91 



































































  (LIQUID) 
Source: Ban (200 s e 1- and 
99-percent level. 
kscope  8). Note: To eliminate outliers, all bank-specific variables are win orized at th 
25 
Mean 







Table 5: T-Test on the Sample 
















Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE)  14.   13.53  -4,63*** 
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR)  82.51 2*** 
eturn-on-Assets (ROA)  0.21  0.   2,54** 
5
rt-Term Funding (LIQUID)   86 * 
l Revenue (NIREV)  44
    
  71.03  -4,1
R 66
Total Equity/Total Assets (CAPITAL)  10. 4  12.51  2,43** 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Sho 25.   37.62  5,45**
Net-Interest Revenue/Tota 35.   32.75  -2,16** 
 









T ts  ere not 
cquired




ts) (SIZE)  4 0**
T-
Sta
Log(Total Bank Asse 14. 4  13.53  -3,6 * 
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR)  87.64
0.07 
CAPITAL)  10.56  54 
 Funding (LIQUID)   26.32  * 
32.84  0.05 
    
  71.03  -3,59*** 
Return-on-Assets (ROA)  0.66 
12.
2,28** 
Total Equity/Total Assets ( 51  1.
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term 37.62  4,44**
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue (NIREV)  32.75  -
 



















IZE)  14.15 
T-Test
Sta c 
Log(Total Bank Assets) ( 13.53  -2,95*** 
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR)  77.18  16** 
0.35  27 
53
g (LIQUID)   38 *** 
et-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue (NIREV)  1 2**
    
71.03  -2,
Return-on-Assets (ROA) 




2,04**  10.  
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Fundin 25.   37.62  3,56
N 38. 9  32.75  -3,1 * 
 








Targ s  argets 








Log(Total Bank Assets) (SIZE)  14.   14.15  0.
Cost-Income Ratio (CIR)  87.64
sets (CAPITAL)  10.56  10.53  0.02 
Liquid Assets/Customer and Short-Term Funding (LIQUID)   26.32  25.38  0.22 
Net-Interest Revenue/Total Revenue (NIREV)  32.84  38.19  -2,22** 
  77.18  1,94* 
Return-on-Assets (ROA)  0.07  0.35  -0,81 
Total Equity/Total As
Source: Own Calculations. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10-percent level.  
Table 6: Correlation Analysis 
   SIZE  TAL  LI D  CEEC  DP AGDP  E  INDE -  ROA  NIREV  CAPI QUI LIST  EMU  IMG  STKMCAP  DB C3  INVFREE  FINFRE PEN













.176 0 *  1
QUID -0.1900* 2*  0.4530*
LIST 0.0566* *  -0.0007 -0.
EMU 0.0890* .0828*  -0.0202 0. 1
CEEC -0.1476* *  0.0008  0.0076 -0. -0.4048* 1
IMGDP -0.0583* 48  .0651*  -0.0602* -0. 0.0 -0.2194* 0.5775*
STKMCAP 0.1344* 7*  0.0149  0.0601* 0. * -0. -0.0025 -0.4727* 62*  1
DBAGDP 0.1711* 02* -0.0679*  -0.0100 0. * - 0.2111* -0.7016* -0.3407* 0.4020* 1
C3 -0.0494* 6*  0.0152  -0.0880* -0. 0.2495* -0.1405* 0.0524* 95*  -0.1539* 0.0582*
INVFREE 0.0769* 03*  -0.0008  0.0041 0. * 0.0022 0.1063* -0.1556* 77*  -0.0098 0.3949* 0 * 1
FINFREE 0.0537* 7*  0.0900*  0.0545* 0.0446* 0.0880* -0.4983* 0.0316* 16*  0.3432* 0.1247* -0. 1* 0.2192* 1
INDEPENDENCE -0.1126* 19  0.0644*  0.0312* -0.0508* 0.0758* -0.2708* 0.4562* 89* -0.2184* -0.4198* -0.0709* -0.0389*






















































Note: * indicates significance 10-percent level.   at the 
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Table 7: Merger Control Indices 
The I pendence of the Supervisory Authority Index and the Transparency of Merger Control Index are from 
Köhle 007). Both indices are constructed based on a survey am g the supervisory authorities in the EU 
banking sector. Index values are not available for Belgium. Cyprus, nmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
The  pendence of Supervisory Authority Index measures the de ree of independence of the supervisory 
authority. The index is constructed based on data from the Banking and Supervision Database of the World Bank 
(Bart  al., 2001 and 2006). It ranges from zero to two wi r values indicating a greater degree of 
indep ence of the supervisor.  
Indep ence of the Supervisory Authority Index (INDEPENDE E) 













Austr 193 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.00  0.47 ia 
Belgium 
s  
..  ...  .
C y p r u ..  ...  .
Czech Republic  90 0.71 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.46
Denmark  ..  ...  .
Estonia 31 1.50 1 1.50 1.50  0.00
Finland 16 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.00
France 1,027  1.00 1 1.00 1.00  0.00
Germany 1,440  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.00
Greece 62 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Hung 98 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.00
I r e l a n ..  ...  .
Italy 506 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.00
Latvia 51 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50  0.00
Lithuania 107 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00  0.00
Nether s 153 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.00
Poland 217 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.00
Portugal 19 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.00
Slovak Republic  102 1.37 1.50 1.50 1.00  0.22
Slovenia 112 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50  0.00
Spain 235 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.00






















m  ..  ...  .
Total  4,537  1.03 1.00 2.00 0.00 0.23 
Source: öhler (2007) 
The T sparency of Merger Control  sparency of merger control. The index is 
based on a survey among the supervisory  sector and ranges from zero to one with 
higher ues indicating a greater  erger review process. The degree of 
transp ncy of merger control is riteria that are used by the supervisory 
autho e soundness and r.  
Tran rency of Merger Contro





























































Austria 193  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00
Belgium 
ar
..  ...  .
Cyprus  . . . .






k  . ..  .
Estonia 31 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.33  0.12
Finland 16 0. 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
France 1, 0.00 0.00  0.00
Germ 0.00  0.00
Greec 6 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hungary 98 0.33 0.33 0.33  0.00
Irelan . .
Italy 506  0.00  0.00
Latvia 0.67  0.00
Lithuania 107  1. 1.00 1.00  0.00
er ds  0.00  0.00
0.00  0.00
g 0.33  0.00
ak Republic  102  0.36 0. 0.00  0.48
























































































m  .  .
l  4,537  0.05 0.00   0.00 0.20 
..  ..
1.00 Tota
Source: Köhler (2007)  
Table 8: 
Table 8 rep r h ed. 
The depend va ble ke n   wis s  as 
affecting th ds  wit spe o the baseline case and t as mar im te outliers, all bank-specific explanatory variables 99-
percent level e   samp ncludes 1407 commercial ban nd 150  om ic and  cross-border M&A. Since IN NDE are 
not availabl un e number of observation drops from 5 e ple i udes 1103 banks and 141 deals of which  ss-
border. Fo f the variables used in the regression analysis see Tabl
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  0. 0  
 (4.05)    )  (6.31) (6.40) 
ROA -0.173***    -0 ***  -0.201***  -0.174***   
 (-3.59)    1)  (-4.15) (-3.45)  .6
NIREV 0.0152***    0 5***  0.0206***  0.0201***  90
 (2.97)    )  .84
CAPITAL  64  006 00684 
 (0.38)    )  (0.24) (0.38)  .63 .66) 
LIQUID -0.00676***    -0 737  -0.000273  0.00194  001 0822 
 (-2.66)    1)  (-0.12) (0.78)  .66 .32) 
EMU   0.205  434  0.171  0.358  289 436 
   0)  (0.56) (0.75)  .60 .95) 
*  807 385 
  )  .43 .10) 
STKMCAP   -1.105***  -1 ***  -1.617***  -1.309***  .185 43** 
   (-3.92)  1)  (-4.29) (-2.78)  .5 .07) 
DBAGDP   -1.091***  -1.364* ***  -1.433***  -1.543***  40 43*** 
   (-2.88)  (-3.71)  5)  (-3.86) (-3.42)  .7 .80) 
C3  .277 8  256 .226 
  (0.12)  (0.31)  6)  .27 .24) 
INVFREE       0***        75** 
       )        .08) 
FINFREE       0.0106      0921 
       (1.36)      .93) 
INDEPENDENCE      .514 
      .18) 
TRANSPARENCY          1.001 194** 
           .37) 
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2 0.063  0.104  0.164  3  0.165  0.163  0.168 180 




5  -5 -5




  Model 9  Model 10  Model 1 Mo Mo Model 15  Model 1
Table 9: Multinomial Logi
Table 9 reports the results of multinomial logit regressions. Robust standard-errors clustered on bank-level are reported in parentheses. The time-dummies and the constant term are not 
reported. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The dependent variable is a polytomous variable that is zero if a bank was not taken over, one if it was taken by a domestic and two 
if it was acquired by a foreign bank between 1997 and 2005. The regression coefficients reported are to be interpreted as affecting the odds ratio with respect to the baseline case and not 
as marginal probability. To eliminate outliers, all bank-specific explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1- and 99-percent level. The full sample includes 1407 commercial banks and 
150 deals of which 77 are domestic and 73 cross-border M&A. Since INDEPENDENCE and TRANSPARENCY are not available for all countries, the number of observation drops 
from 5815 to 4537. The smaller sample includes 1103 banks and 141 deals of which 72 were domestic and 69 cross-border. For a list of the variables used in the regression analysis see 
Table 3.  
1  del 12  Model 13  del 14  6 








 of Merger C  
 
Domestic 
























































SIZE  0.284***  0.1   0.359***  0 0.353***   0.360* *** 0.366***   0.368***  0.533*** 367***  0. 77**    .482***  0.485*** **  0.480 0.503***   0. 537*** 
 (3.49)    ( (4.38)  (4.39)  (4.33)  (4.37)  (5.47) .38) (5
-0.195***  -0.14     -0.187***  -0. -0.185***  ** -0.189** 7*** -0.175***  ** -0.176***  -0.192*** 0.177*** -0.
(-3.20)  (-2.13)      (-3.06)  (-3 (-2 ) (-2.73)  (-2.76) (-2.79)  (-2.69) 
IREV  0.00822  0.022     0.00808  0. 0.00771  * 0.00739  4*** 0.00781  ** 0.00725  0.0330*** .00554  0.0
(1.18)    ( (1.01)  (0.98)  (0.98)  (0.92)  (3.01) .68) (2
APITAL  0.00996  -0.00     0.00933 -0. 0.00944  9 0.00919  407 0.0109   0.0120  0.00129  .0123  0.0
(0.75)  (-0.37)      (0.71)  (-0. (0 (0.69) (-0.29) (0.83)  (0.92) (0.09)  (0.92)  (0.0
IQUID  -0.00782** -0.00570     -0.00443  0.0 -0.00507   -0.00460 295 -0.00295   -0.00325  0.00540  -0.00375  0.00
(-2.41)  (-1.48)      (-1.41)  (0. (-1.63)  (-1.46)  4) (-0.90)  (-0.99) (1.37)  (-1.16) 
MU      0.229  -0.41 0.0256  -0.5 0.109   0.149  95 -0.433  -0.475  0.0578  -0.299  0.1
    (0.64)  (-0 .07)  (- (0 (0.38)   (-0.76)  (-0.82) (0.09)  0.57)  (0
    -3.489*  3.6 -3.517*  3. -3.517*   -4.064*  *** -3.638*   -4.322**  4.279***  .058**  4.1
    (-1.72)  (4. -1.83)  (4 (-1.90)  (-1.91)   (-1.78)  (-2.10) (2.94)  2.27)  (2
      -1.994***  -0. .280***  -1 -1.874***  -2.387 * -1.980*** -2.021***  -0.885  .417**  -0
    (-3.95)  (-1.51)  (-4.19)  (-1. (-3 4) (-2.86)  (-2.87) (-1.22)  (-2.01) 
AGDP      -0.577  -1.26 -0.693  -1.7 -1.161**  ** -0.793*  45*** -0.443  *** -0.276  -1.468**  -0.979*  -1.7
    (-1.26)  (-2.48)  (-1.54)  (-3. (-2 (-1.66) (-3.50) (-0.86)  (-2.68) (-0.54) (-2.26)  (-1.68)  (-2
    -1.181  1.510  -0.943  1.326 -1.018  -0.505  .376 -1.377  2. *  -1.460  1.705  -1.183  1.
    (-0.88)  (1.23)  (-0.72)  (1.17)  (-0.82)  (-0.38) (1.23) (-0.94)  (1.82) (-1.00) (1.53)  (-0.83) 
          0.0210  0. 48**        0.0223  0.
          (1.51)  (2.07)        (1.25) 
             0.00955  .00890     0.0134  0.0
             (0.81)  .87)     (0.95) 
             -0.327     .910  0.
             (-0.63)  (0.90)     (-1.17) 
NCY                  0.448  1.302**  .232  1.1
              (0.76)  (2.44)  (1.11) 
5,815  5,815  5,815 5,8 4,5 4,537  4,537 









  -0.2 -0.182*
(-2.59) 
  - 1
(-2.75) 
95*** 
N 7***  0347***  0.0341** 0.034 0.0352*   0 322*** 
  (3.39)    (1.07)  3.45)  (3.35)  (3.40)  (3.28)   (0 .88) 
C 412  00368  -0.0039 -0.00 -0.00362 0 0116 
  26)  .72) (-0.30)  (-0.25)  8) 
L   0325  0.00278   0.00 0.00579 499 
  93)  (0.79)  (0.8 (1.50)  (1.24) 






































.937  STKMCAP   -1.212*   -1.052 
  83)  .64) (-1.88)  (-4.41) (-1.9 (-1.36)  (-1.17) 
DB 2**  04***  -2.000* -1.7 -1.702 36*** 
  42)  .27) (-4.01)  .63) 
C3  0.470  1 049 138 
  (0.44)  (0.94) 
INVFREE  03    0201 
     (1.19) 
FINFREE  0    0564 
  (0   
0.  
(0.40) 









          (2.02) 
Observations  15 5,815  37 
Pseudo R
2  0.064  0.141 
Log  Likelihood  -749.8  -687.5 
0.196 0.  0  0. 0.208  0.214 
-643.5 -638.3 -642.8 -578.1  -575.2  -570.9 
203 .197 204 
Note: */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 %-level.  
30 
Tabl d Multi i it eg es on wi Inte tion Ter s  
Table  su  of lo ic a NCY. 
The re e orted are  
and no ro ility. R  standard-errors clustered on bank-level are reported in paren ime-
dumm tant term are not o d. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The time-dummies and 
the co ot reported e sorized at the 
1- and . The samp ncl estic and 69 
cross- of the variables u
   Model 17  Model 20 
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SIZE  **  0.497***  0.413*** 0.363*
  )  .74) 
ROA  -0.188*** -0.180***  -0.195*** 
  .86) (-2.81)  (-2.96) 
NIREV 38  0.0317*** 
 
CAPIT 8 0.0124  -0.
  )  0.04) 
LIQUI 0.00536 
  (0.46) (-1.04)  (1.33) 
EMU  1  0.0170 
  8) 
IMGD 1.399 -4.453**  4.
  0)  2.81) 
STKM ***  -0.858 
  (-2.46) (-2.87)  (-1.17) 
DBAG 11 0.288  -1.449** 
  (-2.22) 
C3 
  .18) (-0.95)  (1.48) 
TRAN L  1.299* 
  (1.78) 
TRAN * 0.908  1.140* 
  )  1.93) 
TRAN E  2.





















































































































0.172  0.210 
Note:  s sign the 10/5/1 %-level. 
 
*/**/*** indicate ificance at 